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d/b/a Glidewell Laboratories

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES R. GLIDEWELL DENTAL
CERAMICS, INC. dba GLIDEWELL
LABORATORIES, a California
corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

KEATING DENTAL ARTS, INC.,

Defendant.

AND RELATED
COUNTERCLAIMS.

Case No. SACV11-01309-DOC(ANx)

**JAMES R. GLIDEWELL DENTAL
CERAMICS, INC.'S NOTICE OF
MOTION AND MOTION IN LIMINE
#9 TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY AND
EVIDENCE RELATED TO
SETTLEMENT
COMMUNICATIONS AND OFFERS
TO COMPROMISE;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

Hearing

Date: January 28, 2013
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Ctrm: 9D, Hon. David O. Carter

Pre-Trial Conf.: January 28, 2013
Jury Trial: February 26, 2013

1 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 28, 2013 at 8:30 a.m. in the
2 courtroom of the Honorable David O. Carter of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff
3 and Counter-Defendant James R. Glidewell Dental Ceramics, Inc. (“Glidewell”)
4 will and hereby does move in limine pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401,
5 403, and 408 for an order precluding Defendant and Counterclaimant Keating
6 Dental Arts, Inc. (“Keating”) from introducing evidence, testimony, or argument
7 related to any settlement communications or offers to compromise.

8 As detailed in the accompanying memorandum, any references to evidence
9 relating to settlement negotiations or offers to compromise are prohibited under
10 Federal Rule of Evidence 408 to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a
11 disputed claim, or to impeach. In this case there is no legitimate, permissible
12 reason for Keating to seek to enter the settlement negotiations or offers to
13 compromise into evidence. Further, any probative value of settlement
14 communications evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
15 prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, and wasting time. Thus, the
16 Court should exclude any evidence, testimony, or argument related to settlement
17 communications or offers to compromise.

18 This motion is made following the Local Rule 16-2 Meeting of Counsel
19 Before Final Pretrial Conference and the discussion of evidentiary matters pursuant
20 to Local Rule 16-2.6, which took place on December 19, 2012 (in-person meeting)
21 and Local Rule 7-3 Conference of Counsel Prior to Filing of Motions, which took
22 place on December 31, 2012 (telephonically) and continued on January 2, 2013
23 (telephonically). The parties’ counsel discussed the issues presented by this
24 Motion, but could not reach agreement.

25 This Motion is based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion, the
26 Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached hereto, the concurrently-filed
27 declaration of Philip J. Graves, the pleadings, records, and papers on file with this
28 Court, all matters upon which the Court may take judicial notice, and such oral

1 arguments as the Court may receive.

2
3 Dated: January 17, 2013

SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.

4
5 By: /s/Greer N. Shaw

6 Philip J. Graves

7 Greer N. Shaw

8 Deborah S. Mallgrave

9 Attorneys for Plaintiff

10 James R. Glidewell Dental Ceramics, Inc.

11 dba Glidewell Laboratories

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

James R. Glidewell Ceramics, Inc. (“Glidewell”) anticipates that Keating Dental Arts, Inc. (“Keating”) may attempt at trial to introduce evidence, testimony, and arguments relating to the parties’ settlement negotiations and offers to compromise. As discussed below, at various times during this litigation, the parties had confidential communications regarding settlement offers, potential mediations, and the like (“Settlement Communications”). These were intended to facilitate the parties’ settlement negotiations, and evidence of them should be excluded at trial under Federal Rule of Evidence 408. Moreover, any probative value of Settlement Communications evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, and wasting time. Therefore, the Court should exclude it under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On November 17, 2011, Keating’s counsel sent Glidewell’s counsel an email, with the headings “SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION” and “ALL EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES APPLY,” in which possible settlement was discussed. [*Id.* at ¶ 2.]

On February 2, 2012, the Court issued Its Settlement Conference Order, which required the parties to engage in settlement discussions and prepare a confidential settlement statement to be lodged with the Court for purposes of the Settlement Conference only. [Docket No. 24.] By letter to Keating’s counsel dated February 7, 2012, Glidewell’s counsel presented an offer to settle. [Graves Decl. ¶ 3.] By letter dated February 13, 2012, Keating’s counsel presented Keating’s counter-offer. [*Id.* at ¶ 4.] On February 15, 2012, Glidewell’s counsel sent Keating’s counsel Glidewell’s counter-offer. [*Id.* at ¶ 5.]

On March 30, 2012, Glidewell lodged its Confidential Settlement Statement with the Court for purposes of the Settlement Conference only and marked it

1 “Confidential.” [*Id.* at ¶ 6.]

2 On December 27, 2012, Glidewell’s counsel sent Keating’s counsel a letter
3 with the heading “Confidential Settlement Communication – Inadmissible under
4 Federal Rule of Evidence 408,” in which Glidewell made an offer to compromise to
5 Keating. [*Id.* at ¶ 7.]

6 **III. ARGUMENT**

7 **A. The Settlement Communications are Inadmissible Evidence at Trial**

8 It is axiomatic that evidence of settlement offers and settlement negotiations
9 – i.e., evidence of “compromising or attempting to compromise” a claim – is not
10 admissible at trial “either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed
11 claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction.” Fed. R.
12 Evid. 408(a); *see also, e.g., Millenkamp v. Davisco Foods Int’l, Inc.*, 562 F.3d 971,
13 979-80 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court should have excluded a letter
14 under Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 408 because it was part of
15 settlement negotiations and did not tend to prove any fact of consequence at issue in
16 the action); *Barrett v. Negrete*, No. 02-CV-2210-L (CAB), 2010 WL 2106235, at
17 *8 (S.D. Cal. May 25, 2010) (excluding settlement discussions); *In re*
18 *Homestore.com, Inc.*, No. CV 01-11115 RSWL (CWx), 2011 WL 291176, at *1
19 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2011) (noting that “evidence of settlement communications is
20 inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 408”).

21 Here, the Settlement Communications referenced were for the purpose of
22 compromising or attempting to compromise the parties’ disputed claims in this
23 action, including Glidewell’s trademark infringement claims and Keating’s related
24 counterclaims. As such, evidence of the Settlement Communications must be
25 excluded under Rule 408(a).

26 **B. Even if the Settlement Communications are Somehow Admissible, They** 27 **Should be Excluded as Unfairly Prejudicial**

28 It is true that Rule 408 provides for certain exceptions: “[t]he court may

1 admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or
 2 prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a
 3 criminal investigation or prosecution.” Fed. R. Evid. 408(b). None of these have
 4 any conceivable application here. Even if it were otherwise, evidence of the
 5 Settlement Communications still should be excluded because any probative value is
 6 “substantially outweighed by the danger of one or more of the following: unfair
 7 prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, ... and wasting time” Fed.
 8 R. Evid. 403.

9 First, “unfair prejudice” means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
 10 improper basis. Fed R. Evid. 403 advisory committee’s note. Improper bases
 11 include unsupported inferences. *See United States v. Kaplan*, 490 F.3d 110, 122
 12 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding that risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed
 13 probative value because the “jury was required to draw a series of inferences,
 14 unsupported by other evidence...”); *United States v. Ravich*, 421 F.2d 1196, 1204
 15 n.10 (2d Cir. 1970) (“The length of the chain of inferences necessary to connect the
 16 evidence with the ultimate fact to be proved necessarily lessens the probative value
 17 of the evidence, and may therefore render it more susceptible to exclusion as
 18 unduly confusing, prejudicial, or time-consuming ...”). Here, admission of the
 19 Settlement Communications would invite the jury to draw unsupported inferences
 20 and to decide the issues not on the substantive evidence, but rather on speculation
 21 as to the parties’ settlement motivations. *See Almonte v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.*,
 22 705 F.2d 566, 569 (1st Cr. 1983) (holding that testimony concerning settlement
 23 negotiations should have been excluded under Rule 408 and 403 because such
 24 testimony is clearly prejudicial).

25 Second, and for similar reasons, admission of the Settlement
 26 Communications would confuse the issues and mislead the jury. Pertinent to
 27 Glidewell’s claim of trademark infringement are : (1) strength of the BruxZir mark;
 28 (2) proximity of the goods sold under the parties’ competing marks; (3) the

1 similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) the marketing
 2 channels used; (6) the type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by
 3 the purchaser; (7) Keating's intent in selecting the mark; and (8) the likelihood of
 4 expansion of the product lines. *See Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc.*, 683
 5 F.3d 1190, 1209 (9th Cir. 2012); *AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats*, 599 F.2d 341, 348-
 6 49 (9th Cir. 1979). The fact that the parties exchanged Settlement
 7 Communications, and the content of those communications, are not among the
 8 *Sleekcraft* factors and are not relevant to infringement. Nor are they relevant to
 9 Keating's defenses that the BruxZir mark is invalid as generic, or as merely
 10 descriptive and without secondary meaning. At issue there is the meaning of
 11 "BruxZir" to the relevant consumers (dentists); i.e., whether dentists understand the
 12 term to refer to a genus of products or, instead, to refer to a particular producer's
 13 products. The Settlement Communications bear no relevance to these issues.
 14 Given their irrelevance to the central issues in the case, admitting evidence of the
 15 Settlement Communications would only serve to confuse the issues and mislead the
 16 jury into focusing on peripheral issues. *See U.S. v. Park*, No. CR 08-00220 MMM,
 17 2008 WL 2338298, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2008) (excluding a settlement
 18 statement under Rule 403 because it was only indirectly probative of the issues and
 19 thus likely to result in distraction and jury confusion).

20 Finally, admitting evidence of the Settlement Communications would waste
 21 significant time at trial. Rather than focusing on the central issues in the case –
 22 including the infringement and validity issues discussed above, as well as damages
 23 – the parties would need to divert time and attention to explaining the reasoning and
 24 motivation underlying their various settlement initiatives, and explaining why the
 25 efforts were unsuccessful. Given the Court's interest in a concise and efficient trial,
 26 any meager relevance of the Settlement Communications is substantially
 27 outweighed by the danger of wasted time.
 28

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should exclude any evidence and argument regarding the parties' Settlement Communications, including but not limited to: (a) the November 17, 2011 email from Keating's counsel to Glidewell's counsel; (b) the February 2, 2012 Settlement Conference Order; (c) the February 7, 2012 letter from Glidewell's counsel to Keating's counsel; (d) the February 13, 2012 letter from Keating's counsel to Glidewell's counsel; (e) the February 15, 2012 communication from Glidewell's counsel to Keating's counsel; (f) Glidewell's March 30, 2012 Confidential Settlement Statement; and (g) the December 27, 2012 letter from Glidewell's counsel to Keating's counsel.

Dated: January 17, 2013

SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.

By: /s/Greer N. Shaw

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Glidewell Laboratories v. Keating Dental Arts, Inc.
United States District Court, Central, Case No. SACV11-01309-DOC (ANx)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 17, 2013, I electronically filed the document described as **JAMES R. GLIDEWELL DENTAL CERAMICS, INC.'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION IN LIMINE #9 TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE RELATED TO SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATIONS AND OFFERS TO COMPROMISE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES** the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF System which will send notification of such filing to the following:

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Dated: January 17, 2013

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